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Wiebke Drescher 
The Eastern Partnership and Ukraine 
New Label – Old Products? 
I. New label… 
On 7 May 2009 the heads of state or government and representatives from 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, EU member 
states as well as EU officials met in Prague and jointly declared to intensify 
their relationships in the future under the umbrella of the Eastern Partner-
ship (EaP). Its main goal is “[…] to create the necessary conditions to acce-
lerate political accession and further economic integration between the 
European Union and interested partner countries.”
1  
Due to the considerable enlargement rounds in 2004 and 2007, which saw 
twelve countries (most of them being situated in the east or south east of 
Europe) added to the EU the Union’s borders have shifted. Today, the Un-
ion neighbours Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. Consequently, the South 
Caucasus and Central Asia have come closer to the Union’s focus. Due to 
their geographical proximity, stability, good governance and economic de-
velopment in these region are of strategic importance to the EU. Ukraine in 
particular has become one of the major partners of the EU in eastern Eu-
rope. It is the largest east European country after Russia, a population of 
around 47 million. It borders seven countries – four of them being members 
 
1   Eastern Partnership Summit: Joint Declaration, Prague, 7 May 2009, 
http://www.eu2009.cz/en/news-and-documents/press-releases/eastern-partnership-
summit:-natural-dimension-of-eu-foreign-policy-20997/ [12 May 2009].  
 Wiebke Drescher 
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of the EU (Poland, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia), plus Belarus, Moldo-
va and Russia. Furthermore, the Ukraine is located on the Black Sea with 
the port city Sevastopol being a (geo-)strategically important place.  
The EaP is the EU’s latest approach to cooperate with its neighbours in the 
east on certain fields of policy more closely. It is based on the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Therefore, the EaP differs from the usual 
enlargement process, which is said to be the EU’s “[…] most successful 
foreign policy instrument […]”
2. There have been concerns among Euro-
peans regarding the scope and pace of enlargement for many years.
3 There-
fore, the EaP is seen as an alternative to the classic enlargement policy.  
However, Ukraine disagrees with the new concept and calls for a member-
ship perspective instead. Among EU officials, Ukraine is seen to be the 
partner country “traditionally […] ahead of the rest – both in what is has 
achieved, and in what it has been offered by the EU.”
4 Therefore, progress 
in the EU-Ukrainian relations has always had impact on other activities in 
the region. Even though Barroso sees the country being in the ‘avant-garde’ 
of the new agreement, Kiev seems not to be amused. At the same time, the 
country has to face several internal challenges. Moreover, the global finan-
cial crisis has hit the country’s economy hard. In addition, there is an ongo-
ing gas conflict with Russia that is likely to break out again next winter.  
Indeed, the EaP is even contended among European officials. Thus, the 
policy has to face several challenges.  
This paper attempts to give an answer to the question if the EaP can give 
fresh impetus to the relations between the EU and Ukraine.  
 
2   Commission of the European Communities: Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A 
new Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, 
COM(2003) 104 final, Brussels, 11 March 2003, p. 5, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf [15 May 2009].  
3   On 1 June 2009 German Chancellor Merkel and French President Sarkozy jointly 
declared that the Union cannot enlarge limitlessly. See Merkel, Angela/Sarkozy, 
Nicolas: 10 Thesen für eine starke EU, Welt am Sonntag, 1 June 2009.  
4   See Speech of Ferrero-Waldner, Benita: After the Russia / Ukraine gas crisis: what 
next?, London, 9 March 2009, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction. 
do?reference=SPEECH/09/100&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLang
uage=en [7 May 2009].  The Eastern Partnership and Ukraine 
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II. The Union and its neighbours in the east  
The reasons for the Union’s interest in the regions in the east of Europe and 
the South Caucasus are various:  
•  Security concerns 
Several domestic policy problems, territorial conflicts and security threats 
have arisen in these states over the course of many years.
5 After the fall of 
the Berlin Wall various regions of the former Soviet Union declared their 
independence. In addition, these new states between the EU and Russia 
have had to face various challenges both internally and externally. Ever 
since, one of their major problems has been to define their relations with 
Russia.
6 Some countries such as Belarus have continued to have strong 
links with Russia up to the present. Others (e.g. Ukraine and Georgia) still 
have economic and political ties with Moscow, but have tried to strengthen 
their relations with western partners in recent years. What they all have in 
common is the challenge to transform successfully from former communist 
countries and planned economies to democratic systems and market econ-
omies. This difficult process is closely related to attempts of some regions 
within these states to gain independence from the Soviet Union’s succes-
sors. Furthermore, border conflicts in the region have always risked esca-
lating into violence. E.g. there is an ongoing crisis between Ukraine and 
Moldova due to a small region called Transnistria that has been seeking its 
independence for a number of years. A better-known example is related to 
the August war between Georgia and Russia in 2008. As a result, South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, both supported by Russia, declared their indepen-
dence from Georgia. Further challenging factors for the region are the il-
legal trade of goods, human trafficking, illegal migration, organized crime, 
terrorism, and the disregard of environmental standards.
7  
 
5   See Aliboni, Robert: The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, European Foreign Affairs, vol. 10 (2005), pp.1-16, p. 1.  
6   See Speech of Semneby, Peter: European Neighbourhood Policy: defining the end 
game, Bled Strategic Forum, 28 August 2006, http://www.bledstrategicforum.org/ 
archive/speech-semneby.doc [15 March 2007].  
7   Aliboni, Robert, p. 1.  Wiebke Drescher 
6   
Due to its size and geographical position, Ukraine can be both a security 
threat or a pioneer of successful transformation and thereby be of impor-
tance to the whole region. Thus, it is in the interests of the EU to have a 
reliable partner in this neighbourhood. 
•  Trade 
It is in the Union’s interest to deepen or to establish good and stable eco-
nomic relations with its neighbours in order to develop commercial rela-
tionships. Both the EU and its bordering countries can benefit from 
opening their market to one another and from an intensification and simpli-
fication of their trade relations through common agreements.  
•  Energy supply 
The security of energy supply for the EU member states is best achieved 
with reliable partners. Therefore, good and healthy relations with its 
neighbours are crucial. Moreover, energy supplying countries also benefit 
from enhanced relations as they can enlarge their market. Ukraine has 
gained in importance due to its role as a transit country for Russian oil and 
gas. Therefore, the Ukranian state has a hand in the EU’s energy supply. 
Due to their dependency on energy security, the buying countries of the EU 
have increasingly worried that resources might become a new global cur-
rency.
8 Thus, it is of utmost importance to have countries like Ukraine inte-
grated into a common energy strategy which regulates delivery conditions 
and the supply relationship in general in order to guarantee transparency, 
reliability and environmental standards.  
 
8   See Interview with Steinmeier, Frank-Walter: Außenpolitik im Zeichen von Ener-
gieversorgung, rbb Inforadio 93,1, 14 October 2006, http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Interviews/2006/061014-SteinmeierRBB.html 
[15 May 2009].  The Eastern Partnership and Ukraine 
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•  External influence 
The EU’s dealing with the regions’ challenges can successfully increase its 
influence on the international stage. It can improve its kudos as a reliable 
international actor and thereby attain the goals laid down in the European 
Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003.
9 The ESS outlined challenges and risks 
for the EU in the century ahead. According to that paper, the key-threats 
were terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional con-
flicts, state failure and organised crime. In order to protect the European 
ideal, it is “[…] in the European interest that countries on our borders are 
well-governed.” Otherwise, conflicts or crises in the neighbourhood might 
spill over and also threaten the EU itself. Therefore, the task is “[…] to 
promote a ring of well governed countries […] with whom [the EU] can 
enjoy close and cooperative relations.”
10.  
Ukraine has shown its interest in moving closer to the west, and eventually, 
in attaining membership of western alliances (e.g. EU and Nato). To turn 
the argument on its head, this means that the EU has a degree of responsi-
bility to encourage closer relations towards its largest neighbour. Moreover, 
Ukraine is seen as a “[…] European country [that] shares a common history 
and common values with the countries of the European Union […]”.
11 
Thus, stable and deep relations are officially desired on both sides.  
III. The Union’s offer: the European Neighbourhood  
Policy  
In 2002, the European Council in Copenhagen presented a new policy for 
an enhanced and reinforced neighbourhood policy. It was on the very same 
date that accession negotiations with ten eastern and south-eastern Euro-
 
9    Solana, Javier: A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy, 
Brussels 2003, http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf [15 May 2009].  
10  Solana, Javier: A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy, pp. 
7-8.  
11    See EU-Ukraine Summit: Joint Declarations, Paris, 9 September 2008, 
http://www.delukr.ec.europa.eu/press_releases.html?id=48778&template [29 April 
2009].  Wiebke Drescher 
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pean countries were ceremoniously concluded.
12 Due to the forthcoming 
addition of twelve new member states the European Council noted “[…] 
new dynamics in the European integration.”
13 With regard to the Union’s 
new neighbours in the east, the heads of state or government furthermore 
highlighted the importance of taking forward relations with their neigh-
bours to “[…] avoid new dividing lines in Europe […]”
14. Therefore, the 
EU’s relations with Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the southern 
Mediterranean were to improve in order to work together in different policy 
fields more successfully.
15  
The principles mentioned in Copenhagen were in line with Solana’s ESS. 
Eventually, the Commission was instructed to develop a new concept that 
became known as ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’ (ENP). In the words 
of the European Commissioner for External Relations and European 
Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the policy towards neigh-
bouring countries “[…] is designed to offer a privileged form of partnership 
now, irrespective of the exact nature of the future relationship with the 
EU.”
16 By saying that, Ferrero-Waldner did not introduce a brand new idea, 
but rather redefined the EU’s foreign policy goals towards its immediate 
neighbours for the future.  
The aims of this policy are to promote reform, sustainable development and 
trade. In the long run, the so-called partner countries are to participate in 
the internal market of the EU and thus “[…] benefit from the prospect of 
 
12  Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
the Slovak Republic and Slovenia joined the European Union in 2004. In 2007, 
Bulgaria and Romania followed.  
13  Council of the European Union: Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European 
Council, 12-13 December 2002, Brussels, 29 January 2003, pp. 6-7, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf 
[15 May 2009].  
14  Council of the European Union: Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European 
Council, pp. 6-7. 
15  Council of the European Union: Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European 
Council, pp. 6-7.  
16  Ferrero-Waldner, Benita: The European Neighbourhood Policy – The EU’s Newest 
Foreign Policy Instrument, European Affairs Review, vol. 11 (2006), pp. 139-142, 
p. 139.  The Eastern Partnership and Ukraine 
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closer economic integration with the EU.”
17 In doing so, the ENP is usually 
based on former bilateral agreements that are now centralised under the 
umbrella of one coherent policy.  
In order to work together successfully, an action plan is developed and im-
plemented by the EU and the particular partner country. This action plan, 
together with strategy papers and country reports of the Commission, 
serves as a framework for enhanced contractual relations in the future.
18 
Furthermore, it lists the next steps to be undertaken by the partner country 
in order to achieve the goals set out in the plan.  
Although European politicians have always stated that enlargement and 
ENP were to be seen independently from each other these two instruments 
have several characteristics in common. First, the ENP was originally de-
veloped in the Commission’s area, usually dealing with the enlargement 
process and later moved to the external relations Commissioner.
19 Second, 
the EU has tended to use enlargement vocabulary – rather unintentionally – 
to describe its new policy.
20 Third, relations between the EU and the part-
ner country respectively are based on certain conditions. “As our partners 
fulfil their commitments on rule of law, democracy, human rights, market-
oriented economic and sectoral reforms and cooperation on key foreign 
policy objectives, we offer deeper political and economic integration with 
the EU.”
21 Thus, the goals of the ENP are similar to the classic enlargement 
goals (stability, prosperity, market access, promoting democracy, civil so-
ciety, and rule of law), even though the outcome is quite different: “A re-
sponse to the practical issues posed by proximity and neighbourhood 
 
17  COM(2003) 104 final, p. 4.  
18   Information about the ENP and its partner countries: http://ec.europa.eu/world/ 
enp/index_en.htm [15 May 2009].  
19   See Kelley, Judith: New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms 
through the New European Neighbourhood Policy, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, vol. 44 (2006) 1, pp. 29-55, p. 32.  
20  E.g.: Ferrero-Waldner, Benita: The European Neighbourhood Policy – The EU’s 
Newest Foreign Policy Instrument, p. 140.  
21  Landaburu, Eneko: From Neighbourhood to Integration Policy. Are there concrete 
alternatives to enlargement?, CEPS Policy Brief 95, Brussels, March 2006, p. 2, 
http://www.shop.ceps.be/BookDetail.php?item_id=1305 [10 December 2006].  Wiebke Drescher 
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should be seen as separate from the question of EU accession.”
22 Conse-
quently, the power of conditionality is limited: the ‘golden carrot’ member-
ship does not belong to the EU’s product range.  
IV. The Union’s offer reloaded: Eastern Partnership  
In June 2008 a Polish-Swedish proposal
23 called for new impulses towards 
the EU’s eastern neighbourhood. The text suggested developing an EaP 
that was based on the ENP but at the same time went beyond it. Thus, it 
proposed to deepen bilateral cooperation between the EU and each partner 
country but also among the partner countries themselves. Furthermore, re-
gional differences were to be taken into account more. The bilateral pro-
posal also suggested including Russia into the framework. At the same 
time, it called for an offer for Belarus, which has not taken part in any EU 
initiative so far. In general, the proposal summarised again the main goals 
of the ENP but furthermore called for more focus on the regional dimen-
sion.  
In the Commission’s proposal of December 2008 it was stated that within 
the framework of the EaP “[…] the guiding principle should be to offer the 
maximum possible.”
24 In other words: if a partner country calls for deeper 
relations and is willing to reform in certain policy fields, the EU eventually 
offers an association agreement that includes the goal of establishing a deep 
and comprehensive free trade area. Another long-term goal would be the 
creation of a regional network among the partner countries. Yet, unlike the 
Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) that has its own secretariat, the EaP is 
to be controlled solely by the Commission.  
Thus, the EaP is meant to provide a platform to discuss the four main areas 
of (future) cooperation: democracy, good governance and stability; eco-
 
22  COM(2003) 104 final, p. 5.  
23  Polish-Swedish Proposal: Eastern Partnership, June 2008, http://www.msz.gov.pl/ 
Polish-Swedish,Proposal,19911.html [6 May 2009].  
24  COM: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council. Eastern Partnership, COM(2008) 823 final, Brussels, 3 December 2008, The Eastern Partnership and Ukraine 
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nomic integration and convergence with EU policies; energy security; con-
tacts between people. So-called flagship initiatives that are to give sub-
stance to the EaP are also supported by the European Council.  
A multilateral approach is nevertheless ensured. The European Parliament, 
the OSCE and the Council of Europe are to work within the framework of 
the EaP. Furthermore, the Committee of the Regions as well as the Euro-
pean Economic and Social Committee are invited to join the EaP in par-
ticular policy fields.
25  
In order to work on the policy fields properly, the Commission intends to 
increase its financial support laid down in the European Neighbourhood 
Policy Instrument (ENPI) step by step from € 450 million in 2008 to € 785 
million in 2013.
26  
The EaP is addressed to six former Soviet countries (Belarus, Moldova, 
Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) that (except for Belarus) are 
already partner countries within the framework of the ENP.  
V. Lack of support among EU member states 
One of the biggest problems for the EaP lays in the EU itself. The latest 
agreement lacks full support from all EU member states. Hence, the policy 
might be considered as weak and just another concept without a solid 
framework.  
This approach was recently tested on 7 May 2009 when the heads of state 
or government of the EU together with their colleagues from the six EaP 
partner countries were invited to celebrate their ‘Joint Declaration of the 
Prague Eastern Partnership Summit’ in the capital of the Czech Republic.  
 
p. 3, http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0823:FIN: 
EN:PDF [6 May 2009].  
25  See COM(2008) 823 final, p. 14.  
26  See COM(2008) 823 final, p. 19.  Wiebke Drescher 
12   
Considering the masses of important statesmen turning out at the Paris 
Summit for the Mediterranean on 13 July 2008
27, the EaP meeting appeared 
minor. This was primarily thanks to the missing high representatives of the 
greater EU states such as France, Italy and the UK. French President Nico-
las Sarkozy was represented by his Prime Minister. Spain sent its Minister 
of Foreign Affairs. The United Kingdom’s head of state was not able to 
attend, for an unknown reason, and sent his Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs. Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi also had a prior en-
gagement. Instead of him, the Italian Minister of Welfare appeared and 
caused confusion. The heads of state or government from Austria, Cyprus, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Portugal also had other things to do. The Lithuanian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vygaudas Ušackas, tried to play the absence 
down. “It’s awkward, but it is in no way significant in terms of support for 
the Eastern Partnership.”
28 It is awkward indeed. There might have been 
understandable reasons why some leaders failed to appear. For instance, 
politicians at the event tried to find reasons for the absence of said leaders 
in the ongoing financial crisis that had hit some countries harder than oth-
ers.
29 However, the event shows that even the EU’s foreign policy is still 
dominated by national interests that are built in geopolitical terms. It was 
during the French EU Presidency that the UfM was launched. Historically, 
France as a former colonial power is more connected to the Mediterranean 
states such as Algeria or Morocco. This is why Sarkozy has always pushed 
initiatives that dealt with improving the networking in that region. When it 
comes to the eastern dimension of the EU’s neighbourhood policy, France 
has usually been quieter and left the issue to other members such as Ger-
many
30 or far smaller initiatives from countries in the east or north
31. This 
is not to blame countries for their decisions. It is to show that there has 
 
27    See Summit for the Mediterranean: Joint Declaration, Paris, 13 July 2008, 
http://www.ue2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/import/07/0713_declaration_de_pa
ris/Joint_declaration_of_the_Paris_summit_for_the_Mediterranean-EN.pdf [25 
May 2009].  
28  Quoted in Rettman, Andrew: Absent leaders deflate EU’s ‘eastern’ summit, euob-
server.com, 7 May 2009, http://euobserver.com/9/28088 [8 May 2009].  
29  Rettman, Andrew: Absent leaders deflate EU’s ‘eastern’ summit.  
30  In 2006 Germany introduced an enhanced approach called ‘ENP plus’.  
31  Such as the initiative of Poland and Sweden in summer 2008.  The Eastern Partnership and Ukraine 
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been no consensus supported commonly on how to deal with the EU’s 
neighbourhood. In the case of the EaP, the six partner countries could – 
again – be the losers, as the initiative lacks support, and more importantly, 
interest.  
The lack of interest by some bigger Western players can also be seen re-
garding how the new instrument was introduced. When the Polish-Swedish 
Proposal on a specific eastern dimension was introduced in June 2008, it 
was considered to be partly a response to the EU initiative for its southern 
neighbours known as UfM. However, the project was of most interest to 
ex-Communist states and countries in the north such as Sweden or Finland 
whereas the Mediterranean project was primarily launched by southern 
countries that are located on the Mediterranean Sea or have historical 
bounds with that region (e.g. France). Thus, neither the UfM nor the EaP 
has been fully supported by all 27 member states. Hence, it is inaccurate for 
Danuta Hübner, European Commissioner for Regional Politics, to claim 
that “[t]he EU’s eastern policy is of interest to the whole EU [.] The weak-
ness of [previous] northern, eastern or southern European Union policies 
was that they existed only in the sphere of interest of member countries in 
those regions.”
32 It was not until the war between Russia and Georgia in 
August 2008 that the EaP gained momentum. At a moment’s notice, the 
eastern neighbourhood of the Union was brought into focus. An extraordi-
nary European Council meeting on 1 September 2008 asked the Commis-
sion among other things to generate a document, also “[…] responding to 
the need for a clearer signal of EU commitment following the conflict in 
Georgia and its broader repercussions.”
33 The Commission’s document of 
December 2008 then also supposed “[…] to offer the maximum possible 
[…]”
34 to the partner countries – words that went beyond the usual EU vo-
cabulary. Usually, the EU has been rather cautious when it comes to offers 
to its neighbours. These rather aggressive words have not been repeated 
since then. Furthermore, Czech officials at the May 2009 summit advo-
 
32  Hübner, Danuta, quoted in Runner, Philippa: Poland and Sweden to pitch ‘Eastern 
Partnership’ idea, euobserver.com, 22 May 2008, http://euobserver.com/9/ 
26194?rss_rk=1 [25 May 2009].  
33  COM(2008) 823 final, p. 2.  Wiebke Drescher 
14   
cated calling the partner countries just “European” instead of “eastern part-
ners” or – as they have been called in the end – “Eastern Europeans”. How-
ever, other member states were already reluctant to use at all the term 
“European” as they regard this statement as “[…] stretching a geographical 
point in the case of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia […]”
35 Moreover, the 
Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende explains that “[i]f you speak about ‘Eu-
ropean countries’ you speak about a European future [accession.]”
36 This 
connection, however, has been avoided by the Union ever since. All in all, 
far reaching considerations have been weakened due to national concerns. 
For instance, Germany, together with other western states, has been reluc-
tant to offer visa-free travel for citizens of the partner countries. The Com-
mission text of December 2008 offers a “phased approach” with talks on 
visa facilitation as a first step followed by visa facilitation agreements and 
afterwards visa-free travel. The document even records the annual cost for 
the Union of a visa fee waiver.
37 Yet the joint declaration of May 2009 
speaks about a “[…] visa liberalization as a long term goal for individual 
partner countries on a case-by-case basis […]”
38 The possibility and ar-
rangement of future visa facilitation has been already outlined in several 
ENP core documents in 2004
39 and 2006
40.  
The great interest in the eastern dimension and the want to act, activated 
through the Caucasus conflict, has already disappeared as highlighted at the 
summit in Prague when the absence of several national leaders illustrated 
the potential weakness of the EaP. Thus, the agreement looks as if it was 
done in a rush. The EU felt that it had to give a fast response and a sign of 
 
34  COM(2008) 823 final, p. 3.  
35  Barber, Tony: EU sets partnership with ex-Communist states, The Financial Times 
UK, 8 May 2009.  
36  Quoted in Rettman, Andrew: Absent leaders deflate EU’s ‘eastern’ summit.  
37  COM(2008) 823 final, pp. 6-7.  
38  Eastern Partnership Summit: Joint Declaration.  
39  See COM: Communication from the Commission. European Neighbourhood Pol-
icy. Strategy Paper, COM(2004) 373 final, Brussels, 12 May 2004, p. 17, 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf [29 May 2009].  
40  See COM: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy, COM(2006) The Eastern Partnership and Ukraine 
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support towards its eastern neighbours due to the progress in its relations 
towards its southern partners and to the conflict between Russia and Geor-
gia. After first actions and statements in summer and autumn 2008, the 
situation has calmed down and has since been pushed into the background 
again.  
VI. The EaP and its implications on the EU-Ukrainian re-
lations  
Ukraine’s attitude towards the new policy is divided. In principal, it sees 
some advantages in the EaP. Ukrainian Vice Prime Minister on European 
and International Integration, Hryhoriy Nemyria, stresses association and 
free trade agreements as well as programmes of institution building to be 
important goals of the initiative. He adds that his country fully understands 
the difficulties of the process of EU enlargement. He fears, however, that 
the EU might slow down the enlargement process artificially. Moreover, in 
his opinion, the EaP still needs to be improved, particularly in terms of se-
curity and defense policies as well as in terms of proper financial aspects. 
He also fears that the EaP could again serve as a substitute for enlargement. 
“In other words, the Eastern Partnership should keep the doors open for the 
states having an ability to become the members of the European Union.”
41  
VI.1. EU-Ukrainian relations – a difficult task  
It still seems to be the same old game in relations between the EU and 
Ukraine: the EU tends to integrate Ukraine in some policy fields, always 
denying the so-called ‘golden carrot’ membership, while Ukraine takes part 
in every EU initiative by stressing at the same time the importance of be-
coming a full member at last.  
 
726 final, Brussels, 4 December 2006, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/ 
com06_726_en.pdf [29 May 2009].  
41  Nemyria, Hryhoriy: Under the world financial crisis deepening of European integra-
tion is one of the key prerequisites to overcome it, 8 December 2008, 
http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/publish/article?art_id=176780114 [25 May 2009].  Wiebke Drescher 
16   
Ukraine fears being forced once more into a multinational policy instru-
ment together with countries such as Belarus, which has been neither an 
ENP partner country nor interested in establishing closer ties with the Un-
ion at all. The approach outlined in the joint declaration and in the Com-
mission’s documents has been already similarly discussed with Ukraine on 
a bilateral level.
42 Moreover, the EU stressed Ukraine to be “[…] a Euro-
pean country [sharing] a common history and common values with the 
countries of the European Union.”
 43 Having stated this, French President 
Sarkozy highlighted that it was for the first time in EU-Ukrainian relations 
that the EU used this term to describe the close relationship.
44 However, 
some EU member states prohibited use of the term ‘European identity’ in 
the official declaration. This may be a case of splitting hair. Nevertheless, 
Ukrainian officials deplored it.
45 
The relationship between the EU and Ukraine has been tested several times 
since Ukraine gained independence in 1991. Ukraine has, more or less, 
been a compliant partner country in the context of the ENP since its intro-
duction. However, this behaviour was not to be expected before the Orange 
Revolution in 2004.  
Ukrainian foreign policy between 1991 and 2004 was characterised by a 
steady opening towards the west while at the same time keeping close rela-
tions with Russia. The second Ukrainian president, Leonid Kuchma, fre-
quently expressed his wish to eventually join the EU. Still, in the majority 
of cases the measures taken remained rhetorical. Consequently, the country 
was once the European “no-man’s land of the 1990s”
46. Moreover, after the 
breakdown of the Soviet Union the EU began to work with the newly inde-
pendent states in the east and the south east of Europe in order to support 
their difficult process of transformation. Western Europeans assumed that 
 
42  See EU-Ukraine Summit: Joint Declarations.  
43  EU-Ukraine Summit: Joint Declarations.  
44  Quoted in Kröncke, G.: Viel Hoffnung, viel Perspektive, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 10 
September 2008.  
45  See Vucheva, Elitsa: Ukraine disappointed with EU ‘hypocrisy”, euobserver.com, 
22 October 2008, http://euobserver.com/24/25978 [24 October 2008].  
46  Kuzio, Taras: Is Ukraine Part of Europe’s future?, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 
29 (2006) 3, pp. 89-108, p. 106.  The Eastern Partnership and Ukraine 
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Ukraine, being a founding member of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), would be a natural part of the Russian sphere of interest. All 
in all, relations between the EU and Ukraine remained contradictory during 
the first 13 years of Ukrainian independence. Ukraine, together with Bela-
rus and Moldova, were seen as special neighbours
47 to the EU and were 
hence treated differently from the candidate countries of eastern Europe.  
It was not until the Orange Revolution in 2004 that Ukraine aroused public 
interest. It was this peaceful revolution of the masses that brought Viktor 
Yushchenko into power who thereafter declared to lead his country into 
western alliances and support the country’s internal transformation process. 
Soon after his victory in December 2004, the newly elected president de-
clared his objectives regarding foreign affairs in front of the European Par-
liament:  
“I hope that in the year 2007 it will be possible for us [...] to begin ne-
gotiations for membership and that we could open up the process of 
negotiations for membership in that way. [...] My final objective and 
that of my country and my government is for Ukraine to join the Eu-
ropean Union.”
48  
The vast majority of Ukrainians expected Brussels to offer accession talks 
immediately. To them the Orange Revolution was a breakthrough in exter-
nal relations with the west.
49  
Observers back then agreed that the EU was caught off guard by the inten-
sity and dynamic of the election campaign. The routine suddenly ended 
when the revolution began and fears that a military conflict might break out 
escalated. Every single European institution came up with suggestions for 
Ukraine’s future. The peaceful Orange Revolution became popular world-
wide and Yushchenko’s victory was celebrated enthusiastically.  
 
47  The so-called ‘New Neighbours Initiative’ of the UK and Denmark in April 2002.  
48  Speech of Yushchenko, Viktor: no title, formal sitting at the European Parliament in 
Strasbourg, 23 February 2005, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pub 
Ref=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20050223+ITEM-008+DOC+XML+V0//EN [10 May 
2009].  
49  See Kuzio, Taras, p. 89.  Wiebke Drescher 
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In the aftermath, the Ukrainian government signed the ENP action plan and 
started to realise the aspects written in the paper. In doing so, the govern-
ment was strongly supported by a vast majority of Ukrainians being in fa-
vour of the west-oriented course for their country. Due to its internal 
reforms the country gained market economy status and became part of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in May 2008.  
However, Ukraine’s first reaction to the ENP was bitterness. The 2005 ac-
tion plan had been negotiated between the EU and the former government, 
Ukrainians said. In their opinion, the EU had to come up with a new 
agreement that took the current situation into account.
50 “The neighbour-
hood policy already seems to have been overtaken by events. The scope 
and dimension of our relations should be based on the fact that Ukraine is 
an integral part of a united Europe already.”
51  
Yushchenko’s words were heard, but nothing much has changed so far. 
Thus, emphasising on the one hand on the important role of Ukraine in the 
EaP and stressing on the other hand the Europeanness of the country must 
have been pleasing words for Ukraine. However, even these words, togeth-
er with enhanced agreements might not convince the Ukrainian citizens to 
support the President’s west-oriented course any longer. Current opinion 
polls show that people favour integration with Russia (42 percent) over in-
tegration with the EU (34 percent).
52  
VI.2. Politics 
It is questionable that the EaP can help to improve relations in the future.  
 
50    See Solonenko, Iryna: European Neighbourhood Policy – The Perception of 
Ukraine, in: Marco Overhaus/Hanns W. Maull/Sebastian Harnisch (eds.): The New 
Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union. Perspectives from the European 
Commission, France, Germany, Poland, Ukraine and Moldova, Foreign Policy in 
Dialogue, 6 (2006) 19, pp. 44-51, p. 47, http://www.deutsche-
aussenpolitik.de/newsletter/issue19.pdf [12 December 2006].  
51  Speech of Yushchenko, Viktor: no title, formal sitting at the European Parliament in 
Strasbourg.  
52    See Rettman, Andrew: EU summit text loaded with eastern tension, euob-
server.com, 7 May 2009, http://euobserver.com/9/28081 [7 May 2009].  The Eastern Partnership and Ukraine 
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One of the four thematic platforms within the framework of the EaP deals 
with promoting democracy, good governance and stability. “[D]emocratic 
institutions and effective state structures […]”
53 are to be supported by the 
new instrument. This approach has already been stated in the EU-Ukrainian 
action plan and it is arguable if the newly granted financial assistance is 
sufficient to pursue this strategy. 
Ukraine suffers from an inability of its political leaders to find common 
and long-term solutions as well as a common foreign policy goal. Due to 
major (constitutional) changes in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, 
the political system of Ukraine is neither presidential nor parliamentary. In 
fact, it is a hybrid as it mixes both approaches. However, due to personal 
tensions between the political leaders, neither the president nor the prime 
minister has been able to rule. On the contrary, President Yushchenko and 
Prime Minister Tymoshenko have accused one another several times of 
putting personal interests higher than the country’s progress and therefore 
suggested the other should step down (Tymoshenko on Yushchenko)
54 or 
blamed the other for betraying national interests (Yushchenko on Tymo-
shenko)
55. Moreover, there has been an ongoing conflict between the presi-
dential secretariat and the cabinet. Since Yushchenko came into power in 
2004 Ukraine has had three different prime ministers. In addition, Yush-
chenko suspended the parliament in 2007 and again in 2008. Viktor Yanu-
kovych was forced to go into opposition in 2007 even though his party has 
had the majority of seats in parliament for two years.  
The next presidential elections are to be held in January 2010. Opinion 
polls of April 2009 show a decline in voters’ support for Yushchenko (2 
percent only). By contrast, Yanukovych would poll around 22 percent and 
Tymoshenko 15 percent.
56  
 
53  COM(2008) 823 final, p. 11. 
54  Tymoshenko demands Yushchenko’s resignation, Kyiv Post, 20 December 2008, 
http://www.kyivpost.com/nation/32219 [28 May 2009].  
55  Yushchenko compares talks on Russian loan for Ukraine to Molotov-Ribbentrop 
pact, Kyiv Post, 10 February 2009, http://www.kyivpost.com/nation/35239 [28 May 
2009].  
56    Quoted in ukraine-analysen, No. 57/09, p. 14, http://www.laender-
analysen.de/ukraine [28 May 2009].  Wiebke Drescher 
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Ongoing power struggles, corruption and changing political attitudes 
among the Ukrainian elite have been paralysing the country and are likely 
to last.  The Eastern Partnership and Ukraine 
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VI.3. Economy 
It is the economy, however, that Ukraine has to struggle with these days. 
The country has undergone hard times since the beginning of the global 
financial crisis. After years of growth averaging above 7 percent,
57 Ukraine 
was hit badly by the global financial crisis last year. Its key industries 
(steel, mining, and construction) have been hit worst. Fortunately, Ukraine 
received financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
already in October 2008 and could therefore avoid worse. Still, analysts 
prognosticate a deep recession in 2009.
58  
In contrast to the IMF, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment, and the World Bank, the EU has not found proper answers to the 
economic problems of Ukraine. The European Council in March 2009 sees 
the challenges of the financial crisis and emphasises to do “[…] its part to 
support demand […] The European Union will take a leading role at the 
global level in promoting a swift return to sustainable economic growth.”
59 
Despite its being up-to-date on the first pages of the Presidency Conclu-
sions, the included declaration on the EaP uses the established terms which 
by now are rather widespread. Moreover, the EU offers its partner countries 
in the east “[…] the creation of a network of bilateral agreements among 
the partners, possibly leading to the creation of a Neighbourhood Economic 
Community.”
60 Unfortunately, the EU only briefly touches on this topic 
and gives no further explanation as to what that is supposed to mean in de-
tail. That is not to say that the EU is obliged to treat Ukraine like it would 
treat its member states. Still, the EU’s latest initiative towards its eastern 
neighbourhood would provide more confidence if it gave answers to cur-
rent economic challenges, too. “The Eastern Partnership is a step forward. 
 
57  See The World Bank: Country Brief 2009, April 2009, http://web.worldbank.org/ 
[15 May 2009].  
58  See The World Bank: Country Brief 2009. 
59  Council of the European Union: Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Coun-
cil, 19/20 March 2009, Brussels, 29 April 2009, pp. 7-8, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/106809.pd
f [15 May 2009]. 
60  COM(2008) 823 final, p. 5. Further vague comments on pp.9-10.  Wiebke Drescher 
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But it is still a typical EU solution – a long-term, technocratic instrument 
for a region full of short-term crises.”
61 
VI.4. Energy 
Interestingly, the Union’s vocabulary gets more explicit when it comes to 
its own energy security. Along with former agreements, the EaP aims to 
fully integrate Ukraine’s energy market with that of the EU.
62 Meetings are 
to be held in 2009 and there is no ‘in the long run’ vocabulary whatsoever.  
In the past, Ukraine has struggled to be a reliable partner to the EU as a 
transit country for oil and gas from Russia. As shown in January 2009 and 
in winter 2006, Ukraine cannot guarantee to deliver gas and oil to European 
households as well as to its own national consumers. This situation became 
evident once again in the beginning of 2009, when the Russian company 
Gazprom turned off its gas supply due to unbalanced accounts. Following 
this action, mainly the south eastern European countries such as Bulgaria or 
Romania were affected deeply and had temporarily to close public build-
ings because they were not longer able to heat them.
63 This might become 
an annual winter event if Russia and Ukraine do not find a way out of this 
dispute. Gazprom has already threatened a repeat of the January events if 
Ukraine is unable to balance its account.
64 Moreover, the Russian President 
blamed Ukraine and stressed Russians reliability. “There are no problems 
on our side. Everything is in order here.”
65 Meanwhile, the EU has reluc-
tantly offered support to find a solution in the ongoing dispute in order to 
 
61  Wilson, Andrew (ECFR), quoted in Rettman, Andrew: EU summit lext loaded with 
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62  See COM(2008) 823 final, p. 8. 
63  See Schäffer, Sebastian/Tolksdorf, Dominik: Dispute between Russia and Ukraine 
settled? – Strategies for the European Union to get out of the gas trap, CAPerspec-
tives, No. 1, January 2009, p. 1.  
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server.com, 28 May 2009, http://euobserver.com/9/28200/?rk=1 [28 May 2009].  
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secure its energy supply in the future.
66 Ukraine is highly dependent on 
Russia because almost 80 percent of gas from Russia to Europe crosses 
Ukraine. Moreover, around 75 percent of Ukraine’s national gas imports 
are from Russia or Central Asia and supplied through Russia.
67 Although it 
might initially have been an economic dispute between Russian Gazprom 
and Ukrainian Naftogaz, it has become politicised on both sides and chal-
lenged the political relations not only between Russia and the Ukraine but 
also between Russia and the EU as well as Ukraine and the EU. Further-
more, Russia has refused to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty
68 and has the-
reby avoided subjecting itself to multinational and international 
conventions or declarations. Russia seems to use its energy supplies as a 
political tool.  
VI.5. Russia  
Successful attempts with regard to the EaP are further hampered due to the 
unclear and difficult relationship between Ukraine and Russia in general. 
Bordering the EU and Russia at the same time, Ukraine’s geographical po-
sition is the main challenge the country has to face externally. Existing be-
tween different great powers has always been part of Ukraine’s history. For 
centuries, the area of Ukraine today partly belonged to Poland, Lithuania, 
Russia, Turkey and Austria. Every single potentate has left his mark on the 
Ukrainian mentality, culture and politics. Yet it is the common history with 
Russia that has influenced the eastern European country the most regarding 
language, culture, politics and economy.
69  
Therefore, EU policies towards its neighbour in the east should always 
keep Russia in mind. Ukraine might be independent and sovereign but it 
 
66  See Rettman, Andrew: EU leaders to debate risk of fresh gas crisis, euobserver.com, 
29 May 2009, http://euobserver.com/9/28213/?rk=1 [30 May 2009].  
67  See Schäffer, Sebastian/Tolksdorf, Dominik: Dispute between Russia and Ukraine 
settled? – Strategies for the European Union to get out of the gas trap, CAPerspec-
tives, No. 1, January 2009, p. 1. 
68  See Rettman, Andrew: EU-Russia summit ends with prickly exchange over energy.  
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has had close ties with Russia that should not be tested carelessly. Offering 
western alliance to countries in the east of Europe or South Caucasus with 
respect of Russian reservations is truly difficult. That is not to say that the 
EU should naturally treat Ukraine as it did in the 1990s. Times have 
changed, and Ukraine has expressed its will to move on towards the west. 
Still, as Javier Solana puts it: “[T]here is no alternative to a strong relation-
ship [between the EU and Russia]. We need Russia as much as Russia 
needs the EU and that is why contacts are ongoing.”
70 And that is why – 
even though the relations have been affected deeply by the August war be-
tween Russia and Georgia – the EaP explicitly invites Russia to join the 
agreement in particular policy fields. Furthermore, the EaP is to be pursued 
“[…] in parallel with the strategic partnership with Russia […]”
71 and the 
joint declaration also emphasises the parallel development of relations with 
both partner countries and “third states”
72. Moreover, Barroso points out 
that “[t]he Cold War is over, […] and where there is no Cold War, there 
should be no spheres of interest.”
73 These last words however are not likely 
to calm Moscow. Russia has been suspicious towards closer ties between 
the EU and what Russia calls the region in which it has had “privileged in-
terests”
74 ever since. These interests towards Ukraine were outlined clearly 
by Putin at the Nato summit in Bucharest in 2008: “Well, seventeen mil-
lions Russians currently live in Ukraine. Who may state that we do not 
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have any interests there?”
75 Russia has treated the EaP as a new threat – 
first to its own security and second to its relations with Europe.  
It was in the very same document in September 2008 that the EU con-
demned Russia sharply for the August war and launched the EaP. There-
fore, one could get the impression that the new foreign policy instrument 
was to be a direct and critical response to the conflict. Moreover, on 23 
March 2009, the EU and Ukraine signed a document on the modernisation 
of Ukraine’s gas transit system. Russia, however, was not even invited. In-
troducing the Russian National Security Strategy, President Medvedev 
pointed out that “[w]e understand security […] also in terms of economic 
security.”
76 As the gas crossing Ukraine comes from Russian territory, Rus-
sia was not amused being ignored.
77 Consequently, the EU-Russia summit 
on 22 May 2009 ended with the result that Russia showed no intention of 
ratifying the Energy Charter Treaty.  
“We tried to convince ourselves [that the EU project is harmless] but 
in the end we couldn’t. […] What worries us is that in some countries 
attempts are being made to exploit this structure as a partnership 
against Russia.”
78 
Therefore, the EaP might not be “[…] a way for peacefully solving tensions 
in the region […]”
 79, as Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk optimistically 
put it in 2008.  
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VII. …old products?  
All in all, the EaP is unlikely to give fresh impetus to the EU-Ukrainian 
relations. First, the EaP seems to be weak as it lacks support among all 27 
EU member states. In addition, the increased budget is not sufficient to ful-
fil the needs written in the joint declaration. Second, the EaP tends to focus 
on a rather regional perspective and asks for better cooperation among the 
partner countries as a long-term goal. However, these partner countries 
have totally different goals. For instance, Belarus has not even taken part in 
the more general ENP approach yet. On the contrary, Ukraine has called 
for a membership perspective for many years. Moreover, there have been 
ongoing tensions and conflicts among EaP partner countries (e.g. between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan on Nagorno-Karabakh). Therefore, one might get 
the impression that the EU tries to connect different countries in the east 
just because they are in the eastern proximity.  
Third, current opinions polls in Ukraine see a decline in EU sympathisers. 
Reasons for this are manifold: there has been neither progress in visa facili-
tation nor have there been visible EU projects within the country. Moreo-
ver, it was thanks to the IWF, and hardly to the EU, that Ukraine got 
financial assistance in order to cope with the financial crisis. 
Additionally, Ukraine has revived its CIS membership that has been in the 
background for many years. While the EU and Russia have to fear ongoing 
tensions on their common neighbourhood, Tymoshenko attended a sitting 
of the Council of heads of CIS member states in Kazakhstan in May 2009 
and talked about common measures to cope with the financial crisis. At the 
same event, she stressed Russia’s role in the CIS and thanked Putin for 
deepening their bilateral cooperation. Furthermore, she initiated the next 
meeting being held in Ukraine – not just anywhere in Ukraine, but in Cri-
mea which has been an arena for warlike operations between Ukraine and 
Russia for many years. Russia has rediscovered the post-Soviet alliance as 
well, stating its relations with the CIS countries to be “[…] Russia’s most 
important foreign policy priority […]”.
80 The CIS might lack an effective 
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structure and clear goals. Yet, it offers visa-free travel for its members and 
recognition of university diplomas – visible measures for the states’ citi-
zens.
81  
Thereby Tymoshenko acts partly against Yushchenko’s wishes. The next 
presidential elections in Ukraine may be crucial as two candidates – namely 
Tymoshenko and Yanukovych – are likely to get the majority of votes. 
Both of them have tried to deepen the relations between Ukraine and Rus-
sia and have also gained support of the majority of Ukrainians. In addition, 
newspapers report on secret talks about a possible future cooperation be-
tween the former rivals.
82 Yanukovych has usually placed a higher value on 
relations with Russia than relations with the EU. If he wins the presidential 
elections in January 2010 he and Tymoshenko are likely to form a coali-
tion. 
Regardless of the ongoing internal changes in Ukraine the EU should con-
centrate on organising effective and viewable projects within the frame-
work of the EaP in order to communicate to Kiev that closer ties will lead 
to enhanced cooperation with the EU in the foreseeable future. Further-
more, the EU should communicate to Moscow that 19
th century Realpolitik 
is over. “The new Eastern Europeans and nations of the South Caucasus are 
not a prize to be won or lost in a global geopolitical game.”
83 As long as the 
EU and Russia quarrel over their foreign policy instruments and see them 
automatically as threats, countries like Ukraine will probably remain torn 
internally, being dependent on both.  
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